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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATEOFUTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990534-CA 
v. : 
BRIAN JAMES RUDOLPH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) ("pour-over" provision). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Has defendant established plain error or exceptional circumstances to justify 
appellate review of his unpreserved challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence? 
Because defendant admits that he failed to preserve this issue, this Court should 
refuse to address the sufficiency claim for the first time on appeal unless defendant 
establishes the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, plain error by the trial court, or 
exceptional circumstances justifying review. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5,7-8 (Utah App. 
1996), cert denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). Accord Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 
258 (Utah 1998); State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah App. 1998). 
2. Alternatively, to the extent defendant's closing argument preserved a general 
challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, does the evidence provide a 
reasonable basis for the jury's verdict? 
An appellate court assumes that the jury "believed the evidence and inferences 
which support the verdict" and upholds the conviction unless the marshaled evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime." State v Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309, H 30, 
381 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App.) (citing State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 
1997); State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993); and State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 
1156 (Utah 1991)) (quotation marks omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
Copies of the following relevant statutes and rules are included in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) (aggravated robbery) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 17 (Trial Proceedings) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 23 (Arrest of Judgment) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24 (Motion for New Trial) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50 (Motion for Directed Verdict and 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 (Motion for New Trial) 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 29 (Motion for Judgment of Acquittal). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 23, 1998, an information charged defendant with two counts of 
aggravated robbery (R. 2-4). Count I charged defendant with the January 18,1998, 
armed robbery of the Travelodge Motel, 524 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, in 
which approximately $700 was taken; Count II charged defendant with the January 20, 
1998, armed robbery of the Deseret Inn Motel, 50 West 500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
in which approximately $850 was taken (id.). Prior to the preliminary hearing, a formal 
line-up was conducted at defendant's request which resulted in defendant being identified 
as the Deseret Inn robber (R. 23-24;R.156: 93-94).1 Following a preliminary hearing, 
defendant was bound over on both counts (R. 26). 
Subsequently, the two counts were severed at defendant's request (R. 17). The 
case then proceeded to trial on what was originally Count II of the Information, the Desert 
Inn aggravated robbery (R. 2-4, 32). Following a two-day jury trial, defendant was 
convicted as charged (R. 76-77, 117-119). On March 22, 1999, he was sentenced to the 
statutory term of five years-to-life imprisonment, to run concurrently with the sentence he 
was already serving (R. 124-25).2 After receiving an extension of time in which to file a 
1
 Mr. Greg Davis, the Deseret Inn motel clerk, positively identified defendant 
(R. 156: 93-93). The record does not reflect whether other individuals connected with 
either robbery participated in the line-up. 
2
 Following defendant's sentencing in this case, and his guilty plea in an unrelated 
theft case, the State dismissed the Travelodge charge (R. 147-48). 
3 
notice of appeal, defendant timely appealed (R. 127-33, 135). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
On January 20,1998, Greg Davis was employed as the front desk clerk for the 
Deseret Inn Motel (R.156: 65-66, 69-70). When he began his shift at 4:00 p.m., he 
counted the money in the cash drawer; there was $400.00 (R.156: 69, 86). Over the next 
two to three hours, he took in approximately $400.00 to $450.00 dollars, resulting in a 
total of $800.00 to $850.00 in cash in the motel's cash box (R.156: 85-87, 101). 
Around 6:00 p.m., defendant entered the well-lit lobby of the motel (R.156: 69, 72-
74, 76, 133). Mr. Davis, who was alone, was immediately aware of defendant because 
the motel's front door "chimes" when opened (R.156: 70-71). Based on prior experience, 
Mr. Davis was "wary" and "somewhat frightened" when defendant approached with both 
his hands in his front pockets (R.156: 75). For this reason, Mr. Davis continually 
watched defendant as he walked across the lobby (R.156: 70-71,74, 94-95). 
Defendant stopped very close to the counter, leaving only two and one-half to 
three feet between himself and Mr. Davis (R.156: 70-71). Defendant's face was 
uncovered (R.156: 74). Mr. Davis, who was wearing his glasses which gave him 20/20 
vision, had a "good view" of defendant; Mr. Davis was undistracted as he observed 
3
 Except as otherwise noted, the facts are stated "in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict." Chaney, 1999 Utah. Ct. App. 309,130, 381 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (citing 
Brown, 948 P.2d at 343). The trial transcripts are externally numbered as R.156 and R. 
157. Internal pages of each volume are designated as (R.156: 3). 
4 
defendant's face, hair length, hair color, height, weight, skin color, age, and clothing, 
which consisted of a long gray sweater and baggy blue pants (R.156: 74-75, 89). Mr. 
Davis observed a plain metal hoop earring in each of defendant's ears (R.156: 129-31). 
Defendant also smelled strongly of what Mr. Davis assumed was "hair gel" since 
defendant's hair was "moussed and spiked" (R.156: 91). 
Defendant asked the price of a room and Mr. Davis responded (R. 156: 76). 
Defendant said that the price sounded "good"(R.156: 77). Mr. Davis waited a moment to 
see if defendant was going to request a room (id.). Defendant instead "pulled a gun out of 
his right front pants pocket and said, "why don't you give me, you know, the money in 
the till" (id.). Defendant repeated, "give me the money, give me the money" (R.156: 80). 
Mr. Davis's "first impulse was to reach for the gun" which was held by defendant in his 
right hand, slightly above his waist line, pointing generally in Mr. Davis's direction 
(R.156: 78-79). Mr. Davis decided "no, this is serious, I could get hurt" and moved 
quickly to the cash drawer which was five feet to his right (R.156: 80). Mr. Davis 
removed the wooden cash box and placed it on the counter in front of defendant (R.156: 
80-81). As soon as defendant reached into the box to remove the cash, Mr. Davis moved 
back into a small room directly behind the counter and locked the door to avoid being 
shot (R.156: 81-83). Mr. Davis stayed in the room until he heard the lobby door chime 
again, indicating defendant had left (R.156: 83-84). 
Just as Mr. Davis came out of the room, Leonard McCann, a customer, walked into 
5 
the lobby (R.156: 84). Mr. McCann had been in his car in the motel's carport area in 
front of the glass wall of the lobby (R.156: 104). Believing the man at the counter was 
just registering, Mr. McCann waited outside and only walked in as the man exited (id.) 
Mr. McCann noticed that the man was about his same height with a medium build (id.). 
Mr. Davis told Mr. McCann he had been robbed (R.156: 105). Within "30 seconds," Mr. 
McCann went back outside to see if he could determine where the robber went (R.156: 
106-07). About 150 feet from the motel, Mr. McCann saw 
this individual going down the street. He was moving at a - he wasn't 
running and he wasn't walking, he was just going pretty fast. And he 
looked like he didn't know where he wanted to go. He kinda looked out at 
the street and out at the other direction like he was trying to decide where 
he wanted to go. 
(R.156: 106-07). Mr. McCann made "mental notes" of what the man was wearing, 
knowing that he would be asked to later identify him (R.156: 113). The man wore a 
white shirt, which Mr. McCann thought might be a turtleneck since so much of it showed 
above the wide collar of the man's gray loose fitting sweater; the man also wore baggy 
pants of a brighter blue color than traditional dark levis (R.156: 108-13). The man 
appeared headed for the Hilton Hotel, which was about a block west of the Deseret Inn 
(R.156: 107,116-17). 
After receiving the report of the robbery and a description of the suspect, the 
police began canvassing the area around the Hilton Hotel (R.156: 115-17,119). Two 
plain-clothed detectives went into the Hilton, where they observed defendant at a public 
6 
telephone in the lobby area, about seventy feet from the hotel's restaurant Annabelle's 
(R.156: 119-20, 124-25, 149-50). Even though defendant did not have on a gray sweater 
and had on glasses, he otherwise matched the description of the robber in that 
he was wearing a white shirt, his hair was, appeared to be wet like he had 
just wet it down and dried it with a towel, kinda sticking up and kind of in a 
spiked look, wearing levi's, had the earrings. 
(R.156: 121-23). The police stopped defendant for questioning (R.156: 125). Defendant 
told one officer that he was meeting a male friend, Ed Bernard (R.156: 125). A few 
minutes later, he told a different officer that he had was meeting his girlfriend, Melanie 
Swallow, for dinner (R.156: 150-51). 
As the officers detained defendant in a small glassed-in business office inside the 
hotel, Angela Dent, an Annabelle's employee, walked past (R.156: 166). She 
immediately and spontaneously recognized defendant as having been in the restaurant 
twenty minutes before (R.156: 165-67).4 Ms. Dent said defendant entered the restaurant 
wearing a gray sweater (R.156: 165). Because the restaurant was crowded and seating 
was limited, Ms. Dent asked defendant if there was "only one in his party,"and he replied 
"yes" (R.156: 163). About ten minutes after she seated him, Ms. Dent returned to the 
table to make sure defendant had been served (R.156: 164). Defendant was gone but the 
4
 A year later at trial, Ms. Dent could not "definitely" identify the person who had 
entered the restaurant; however, she maintained that the man detained by the police was 
the same man who entered the restaurant (R.156: 163, 165-65). It is undisputed that 
defendant was the person Ms. Dent saw with the police. 
7 
gray sweater was left at the table (R.156: 165). Ms. Dent turned the sweater over to the 
police (R.157: 165; Exhibit 11). 
Despite Ms. Dent's identification, defendant insisted that he had not been in the 
restaurant and that the gray sweater was not his (R.156: 126). He claimed to have no coat 
even though it was a cold winter night (R.156: 125-26; R.157: 175). 
The police brought the clerk, Greg Davis, from the Deseret Inn to the Hilton to see 
if he could identify defendant (R.156: 90). Defendant was still in the glassed-in hotel 
business office with some officers (R. 156: 90, 98-99).5 Viewing defendant through the 
glass wall of the office, Mr. Davis said he was not "100 per cent" certain if defendant was ~ 
the robber: 
[Defendant] didn't have the sweater on. His hair, when he robbed me, had 
been moussed and spiked. His hair, when I saw him at the Hilton, had been ,; 
smoothed down. He did not have glasses on when I saw him. At the Hilton 
he had glasses on. 
(R.156: 91). Mr. Davis believed, however, that all of defendant's other features and 
characteristics were consistent with the robber's, including his height, weight, sex, age, 
color of skin, length of hair, and color of hair (R.156: 89, 92-93. At trial, Mr. Davis also 
testified that defendant's clothing, including his earrings, pants, and the gray sweater 
5
 Because defendant never challenged the circumstances surrounding the show-up, 
it is unclear if defendant was with the plain-clothed officers who had originally detained 
him (R.156: 119, 125, 149-50, 152-53), or whether other uniformed officers or hotel 
security officers were in the room during the show-up (R.156: 135, 152-53, 166,169-70). 
In any case, no one described defendant as under arrest or physically handcuffed. 
8 
retrieved by Ms. Dent, were consistent with the robber's (R.156. 89, 129-30; Exhibits 11, 
13&15).6 
Mr. McCann agreed that the gray sweater found in the restaurant and defendant's 
blue baggy pants were consistent in color and shape with the clothing of the man he saw 
walking away from the Deseret Inn immediately after the robbery (R.156: 109-112; 
Exhibits 11,12 & 13). Additionally, an officer near defendant, inside the hotel business 
6
 Defendant claims that Mr. Davis was only "50 percent sure" that defendant was 
the robber because of the three changes noted and also because defendant did not smell of 
"cologne" and wore "different" earrings; defendant characterizes Mr. Davis's 
identification as "tentative"and "weak" and claims that Mr. Davis "failed to identify" 
defendant {see Brief of Appellant [Br. App.] at 7, 11, 22,24). This is not a correct, 
marshaled recitation of the facts. 
Mr. Davis testified he was less than "100 percent" certain at the show-up because 
of the change in clothing and hairstyle and the addition of the glasses (R.156: 91-92, 99-
100). A police report stated that Mr. Davis was "50% sure" in the show-up that defendant 
was the robber (R.156: 174). Mr. Davis explained that when pressed by the police to give 
some percentage of certainty during the show-up, he may have said 50 or 70 percent but 
knew that he just "wasn't 100 percent" certain (R.156: 92-93, 99-100). He stated that he 
positively identified defendant in a subsequent line-up (R.156: 93-94), and had "no 
doubt" at trial that defendant was the person who had robbed him (R.156: 94). All of this 
testimony was admitted without objection. 
When defense counsel asked Mr. Davis whether defendant smelled of cologne 
when he viewed him at the Hilton, Mr. Davis responded that they were separated by a 
glass partition (R.156: 99). While the police report, referred to above, stated that 
defendant did not smell of cologne at the Hilton (R. 157:174), a different officer testified 
that defendant's hair was wet (R.156: 91,170-71, 173, 195-96, 202-04), a fact, which if 
true, would account for the lack of hair gel smell. Mr. Davis further testified that the 
metal hoop earrings removed from defendant were "consistent" with those he observed 
during the robbery, even though he remembered the earrings as being plain and possibly 
"slightly larger" (R.156: 129-30; Exhibit 15). 
As will be discussed, these differences went to the weight of the evidence and not 
its admissibility. 
9 
office, described defendant's hair as "semi-wet," as if it had been recently wetted, pushed 
back and was now drying (R.157: 170).7 
That same evening, a hotel housekeeper emptied the trash from the public 
restroom directly across from Annabelle's Restaurant and closest to the telephone where 
defendant was arrested (R.156: 123-25,142-43). The housekeeper found a Crossman BB 
gun hidden underneath a plastic garbage bag (R.156: 143-46, 151; Exhibit 14). Mr. Davis 
stated that the gun appeared to be the same as the one used in the robbery (R.156: 77-78; 
Exhibit 14). 
When defendant was booked into jail, $850.00 in cash was found hidden inside his 
shoes (R.156: 137-38). This was the same amount of cash estimated to have been taken 
during the robbery (R. 156: 86). 
The jury convicted defendant of aggravated robbery (R. 117). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant did not request a RamireT* hearing to challenge the pre-trial 
identifications by Mr. Davis, Ms. Dent, or Mr. McCann. Nor did defendant object to the 
7
 The prosecutor argued that defendant's wet hair supported the inference that he 
had attempted to wash or rinse it after the robbery (R.157: 202-04). Defense counsel 
agreed that the evidence supported the inference that defendant may have changed his 
hairstyle but then argued, based on Mr. Davis's identification at the Hilton, that 
defendant's hair was just "different" than the robber's (R.157: 195-96). 
8
 State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) (defense may request a pre-trial 
determination of the constitutional admissibility of an eyewitness identification). 
10 
Mr. Davis's in-court identification of defendant and his clothing, or the in-court 
identifications of the clothing by Ms. Dent and Mr. McCann. Similarly, defendant did not 
move for a dismissal, an arrest of judgment, or a new trial on the grounds of insufficient 
evidence. Despite these omissions, defendant claims that he may challenge the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence, that is, the sufficiency of Mr. Davis's identification of 
defendant, for the first time on appeal because the sufficiency of the evidence is of "such 
vital importance" in a criminal case, that a criminal defendant need not abide by normal 
preservation rules. In the alternative, defendant claims that this Court should consider his 
claim under the "plain error" or "exceptional circumstances" exceptions to the 
preservation requirement. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the Utah appellate courts, the majority of state 
courts, and the federal courts recognize only three exceptions to the preservation 
requirement. An appellate court will review an unpreserved issue, even a constitutional 
one, for the first time on appeal, only if the defendant establishes the ineffectiveness of 
his trial counsel, plain error by the trial court, or exceptional circumstances justifying 
review. Defendant's attempts to craft a fourth exception to the preservation requirement 
- an exception which would apply in virtually every criminal case - is reminiscent of the ~ 
disavowed Breckenridge9 "liberty interest" standard. More importantly, a fourth 
exception to the preservation requirement is unnecessary. Utah appellate courts, in line 
9
 State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). 
11 
with the majority view, already recognize that where the prosecution wholly fails to 
establish a requisite element, the established exceptions of ineffective counsel, plain error, 
or exceptional circumstances will justify reversal. 
In this case, allowing defendant to challenge the legal sufficiency of the , 
identification evidence for the first time on appeal would also smack of "invited error." 
'17. 
Despite the obvious availability of the established exception of ineffective counsel, 
defendant has chosen not to allege his counsel's ineffectiveness on appeal. The reason 
for that choice is apparent: the record establishes that trial counsel's decision not to 
challenge the legal sufficiency of Mr. Davis's identification was a conscious, strategic 
choice. Trial counsel, who is also defendant's appellate counsel, needed the 
discrepancies noted by Mr. Davis during the Hilton Hotel show-up to argue that those 
"differences" undermined the weight the jury should give to the remaining evidence. 
Indeed, trial counsel argued below that Mr. Davis's show-up identification was the 
"freshest" identification and, therefore, the "most likely to be accurate" (R.157: 190-91). 
Yet, on appeal, counsel now argues that the show-up identification was inherently 
• - • ' • ' • • • • • ' . " • J * * 
unreliable because it was unduly suggestive (Br. App. at 11,24-26). It is this type of 
change in position - a change which unfairly prevents full development of the issue 
below - that is one of the dangers the preservation requirement was created to avoid. 
For much the same reason, the trial court had no reason to sua sponte question the 
reliability and, therefore, admissibility, of Mr. Davis's identification of defendant. And 
12 
based on Mr. Davis's identification of defendant, the other identifications of defendant's 
clothing, and the remaining circumstantial evidence, the trial court had no reason to sua 
sponte question the legal sufficiency of prosecution's evidence, or ultimately, the jury's 
verdict. In sum, defendant has failed to establish plain error or exceptional circumstances 
to justify his failure to preserve his legal sufficiency argument. 
Alternatively, to the extent that defendant claims his general defense against the 
charges preserved his current sufficiency challenge, the issue is limited. Defendant's 
failure to move for dismissal constitutes an implicit admission that the prosecution 
evidence was legally sufficient for submission to the jury, i.e., that the prosecution had 
established a prima facie case from which a jury could convict defendant. If a jury could 
legally convict defendant, the only issue possibly remaining is one of fact: whether a 
reasonable jury would convict defendant. Here, the evidence overwhelmingly provided 
the jury with a reasonable basis to convict defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH PLAIN ERROR OR 
MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO EXCUSE HIS FAILURE TO OBJECT 
TO THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE; 
THEREFORE, HE IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THIS ISSUE 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
A. There is No Legal or Policy Justification for Creating a New Exception to the 
Preservation Requirement. 
Utah appellate courts have long followed the established rule that issues, including 
13 
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constitutional issues, which have not been preserved in the lower courts by specific 
objection, will not be considered for the first time on appeal unless the appellant 
establishes the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel, plain error by the trial court, or 
exceptional circumstances to justify their review. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Utah 
App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). Accord Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 
249,258 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994)); State v. 
Vessey, 967 P.2d 960,965 (Utah App. 1998). Under these limited exceptions, an 
appellant must establish that his trial counsel's performance was prejudicially defective, 
the trial court committed obvious prejudicial error, or that such "exceptional or unusual 
circumstances" exist such that it would be "manifestly unjust" not to review the 
unpreserved issue. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-9 
(Utah 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920,923 (Utah App. 1991); and State v. 
Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)).10 
Defendant claims that a fourth exception to the preservation requirement exists: a 
10
 As noted in Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10 n.5, the use of the term "manifest injustice" 
can be misleading. "Manifest injustice" is sometimes used to define "exceptional 
circumstances," in the sense of those truly exceptional cases involving "rare procedural 
anomalies." See e.g. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209; State v. Kazda, 545 
P.2d 190,193 (Utah 1976). But the term more commonly equates to plain error. State v. 
Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309,154, 381 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App.); State v. 
Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221,1226 (Utah 1998); State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059,1061 (Utah 
1991); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1206 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Cobo, 60 P.2d 
952, 958-59 (Utah 1936). In fact, numerous jurisdictions refer to plain error as 
"fundamental error." 3 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 
26.5(d), at 255 n.71 (1984). 
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criminal defendant need not move for dismissal, for arrest of judgment, for new trial or 
otherwise preserve a sufficiency claim because a defendant has the "fundamental right" 
not to be convicted based on insufficient evidence. While the latter is true, defendant's 
assertion that a fourth exception exists is specious and against the weight of Utah, other 
state, and federal authority. Moreover, a fourth exception is unnecessary under the 
current standard. Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 926 (recognizing that existing exceptions to 
preservation rule are "sufficiently broad to encompass any situation requiring Utah's 
appellate courts to consider a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal in the 
interest of justice"). 
Defendant begins with the axiom that a criminal conviction based on legally 
insufficient evidence is unconstitutional. Compare Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
317-24 (1979) (federal court may reverse state court decision on habeas review if it finds 
that "no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;" 
citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), for requirement of proof of all elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt), with Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1992) ( a 
Jackson-type review only determines if there is an "independent constitutional violation 
of Winship; it does not focus on whether the trier of fact made the "correct guilt or 
innocence determination"). From this, defendant improperly conjectures that a criminal 
defendant need not preserve a legal sufficiency claim in the same way he or she is 
required to preserve all other constitutional claims. 
15 
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A handful of jurisdictions do exempt sufficiency claims from their normal 
preservation requirements through statute or rule.11 However, the majority of 
jurisdictions recognize that: 
[t]o entitle an appellant in either a civil or criminal case to urge [on appeal] 
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, he must, 
at the close of all the evidence, have interposed in the trial court a motion 
either for a directed verdict in a civil case or for judgment of acquittal in a 
criminal case. By this procedure the question of the sufficiency of the 
evidence becomes a question of law which the court will consider on 
appeal. It is well settled that absent such motion [the appellate court] will 
not review the evidence. Appellant may not for the first time on appeal 
raise the question of the sufficiency of the evidence. It is equally well 
settled that an appellant who interposes a motion for a directed verdict at 
the close of plaintiff s evidence in a civil case, or a motion for judgment of 
acquittal at the close of the government's evidence in a criminal case, who 
thereafter introduces testimony in his defense, thereby waives his motion 
unless he renews it at the close of the evidence. 
McDonough v. United States, 248 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1957). In other words, 
Upon the trial of a jury case, in order to preserve for review the question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence, a party who believes that he is entitled to a 
verdict as a matter of law must, at the close of all the evidence, make a 
11
 See e.g. State v. Granby, 939 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Mont. 1997) (recognizing 
preservation requirement followed in federal courts but concluding that Montana statute 
permits a sufficiency claim to be raised for the first time on appeal); State v. Green, 691 
So.2d 1273, 1275-76 (La. App. 1997) (Louisiana criminal procedure rule permits a 
sufficiency claim to be raised for the first time on appeal); State v. Ashley, 889 P.2d 723, 
724-25 (Idaho App. 1995) (Idaho civil procedure rule permitting a sufficiency claim to be 
raised for the first time on appeal also applies to criminal cases). See also North Carolina 
Code § 15A- 1446(d)(5) (exempting legal sufficiency claims from preservation 
requirements); Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 1124(A)(7) (sufficiency 
claim may be raised for the first time on appeal). 
Without noting the limited scope of these cases, defendant improperly cites them 
in support of his constitutional argument. See Br. App. at 13-14 n.4. 
16 
motion for a directed verdict in his favor and secure a ruling thereon from 
the trial court. 
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accord United States v. Santistevan, 39 F.3d 
250,256 (10th Cir. 1994) (failure to move for judgment of acquittal precludes review of 
sufficiency claim for the first time on appeal but appellate court may sua sponte review 
for plain error or "manifest miscarriage of justice"); United States v. Atkinson, 990 F.2d 
501, 502-03 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (failure to preserve sufficiency claim through 
motion for acquittal waives appellate review but court may review for plain error or to 
"avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice"); United States v. Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771, 773 
(3rd Cir.) (federal criminal procedural rules preclude appellate review of unpreserved 
sufficiency claims; only exceptions are plain error and manifest injustice), cert denied, 
490 U.S. 1113 (1989); Long v. Smith, 663 F.2d 18,21 (6th Cir. 1981) (state supreme court 
correctly ruled that sufficiency claim was waived where defendant failed to move for a 
directed verdict; however, claim of error injury instruction could be reviewed for plain 
error), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1024 (1982); United States v. Jones, 486 F.2d 1081, 1082 
(5th Cir. 1973) (where defendant fails to move for a directed verdict, sufficiency claim is 
not preserved for appeal absent a "manifest miscarriage of justice'9); Hall v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 959 Utah 109, 111 n.l (Utah 1998) (normally failure to move for directed 
verdict precludes appellate review) (citing Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14,15 n.l (Utah 
1988)). Cf. Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247,255-56 (Utah App.) 
(unlike jury trials, rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not require preservation of 
17 
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sufficiency issues when the "action is tried without a jury"), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1997). See also State v. Moriarty, 914 S.W.2d 416,421-22 (Mo. App. 1996) (plain 
error justified review of unpreserved claim of fundamental instructional error); State v. 
Puaoi, 891 P.2d 272, 278 (Hawai'i 1995) (absence of material element constitutes plain 
error justifying appellate review); State v. Jannamon, 819 P.2d 1021, 1025 (Ariz. App. 
1991) (court will review unpreserved sufficiency claim for "fundamental error" where 
there was no evidence to support crime charged); Casadas v. People, 304 P.2d 626, 627 - r 
(Colo. 1956) (en banc) (unpreserved claim of insufficiency was reviewed on appeal 
because of "total failure" of proof which amounted to "patent" error).12 
While no Utah case has explicitly discussed this preservation requirement in the 
context of a criminal sufficiency claim, the Utah criminal procedure rules governing 
dismissals, directed verdicts, and new trials contain essentially the same language as that 
found in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Compare Utah R. Crim. P. 17(o), 23 & 24, with Utah R. Civ. P. 50 & 59, and with Fed. ,-
R. Crim. P. 29. (Copies of the rules are attached in Addendum A). Indeed, no Utah case 
has recognized any difference between the preservation requirements for a criminal as 
12
 In citing to these other state cases, defendant claims that their discussion of 
"fundamental error" amounts to a recognition of a fourth exception to the normal 
preservation requirement distinct and separate from the existing exceptions of ineffective 
counsel, plain error or unusual circumstances (Br. App. at 12-18). This is not correct. 
Universally, "fundamental error"is treated as simply another expression of plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. See discussion in footnote 10, supra, at 14. 
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opposed to civil case. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7-11; Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922-26. 
Nor should there be any difference in the preservation requirements for civil and 
criminal cases because the rationales behind the "raise-or-waive" rule apply equally to 
both. Those rationales include the recognition: 
"that [the preservation rule] is a necessary corollary of our adversary system 
in which issues are framed by the litigants and presented to a court; that 
fairness to all parties requires a litigant to advance his contentions at a time 
when there is an opportunity to respond to them factually, if his opponent 
chooses to; that the rule promotes efficient trial proceedings; that reversing 
for error not preserved permits the losing side to second guess its tactical 
decisions after they do not produce the desired result; and that there is 
something unseemly about telling a lower court it was wrong when it never 
was presented with the opportunity to be right. The principal rationale, 
however, is judicial economy. There are two components to judicial 
economy: (1) if the losing side can obtain an appellate reversal because of 
error not objected to, the parties and public are put to the expense of retrial 
that could have been avoided has an objection been made; and (2) if an 
issue had been raised in the trial court, it could have been resolved there, 
and the parties and public could be spared the expense of an appeal." 
3 Wayne R. LaFave and Jeroid H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 26.5(c), at 251-52 (1984) 
(quoting State v. Applegate, 591 P.2d 371, 373 (Or. App. 1979)).13 
Turning to the specifics of defendant's claim, defendant asserts that he should be 
able to challenge the sufficiency of the identification evidence for the first time on appeal 
13
 Similar concerns were recognized by this Court in rejecting the overly broad 
concept of "liberty interest" as a new exception to the preservation rule in criminal cases. 
Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (acceptance of State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983) 
"liberty interest" as a separate exception to the preservation requirement would erode 
requirement that parties carry the burden of their own arguments); Archambeau, 820 P.2d 
at 925 {Breckenridge "liberty interest" doctrine would permit exception to "swallow the 
general rule" of preservation in criminal cases). 
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despite his failure to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence below. While 
defendant admits he did not move for dismissal, directed verdict, or new trial, he does not 
acknowledge his other significant omissions: he did not move for a State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), hearing to test the reliability of the pre-trial identifications and he 
did not object to any in-court identification of defendant or his clothing. These omissions 
are significant because defendant's argument is not that the prosecution evidence, if 
believed, is insufficient for conviction. Instead, his argument is that the evidence is 
necessarily insufficient because its "foundation" - Mr. Davis's identification of 
defendant - is the unreliable result of impermissible suggestion. See e.g. Br. App. at 11 
("show-up was highly suggestive . . . Mr. Davis' subsequent identifications are not 
persuasive because he had been exposed to Mr. Rudolph at the show-up"); at 17 
("whether the State had presented sufficient evidence that Mr. Rudolph was the assailant 
despite the lack of positive identification"); at 22 (Mr. Davis' show-up identification is 
the "foundation of the State's entire case . . . [i]f that foundation was faulty, the State's 
case, like a building, collapses"). See also Br. App. at 24-26 (discussing various 
Ramirez-type factors of why show-up and subsequent identifications should be 
disregarded). Because defendant failed to challenge the legal reliability - and therefore 
admissibility - of any identification below, he is precluded from doing so for the first 
time on appeal absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113 
(failure to object to photo array or in-court identification at trial precluded appellate 
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review of due process claim); State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (failure to 
object to eyewitness identification on constitutional grounds when the trial court admitted 
the evidence precluded appellate review); State v. Larocco, 665 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1983) 
(failure to object to line-up and photo array evidence at trial precluded review on appeal); 
State v. Wilson, 608 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Utah 1980) (failure to object to in-court 
identification waives issue on appeal). 
B. Defendant Has Failed to Establish Plain Error. 
Relying on the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant claims that the trial 
court "obviously" erred in failing to sua sponte dismiss, arrest judgment, or grant a new 
trial based on insufficient evidence (Br. App. at 18-19).14 Again, while defendant's initial 
proposition is true - a court may sua sponte dismiss, arrest judgment, or grant a new trial 
for insufficient evidence - his conclusion is not. 
Rules 17(o), 23 and 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permit a trial court to 
sua sponte dismiss an information, arrest judgment, or grant a new trial if the trial court 
is convinced that the evidence is legally insufficient. But the criminal rules provide no 
greater power to a trial court judge in a criminal case than do the civil procedure rules in a 
civil case. In both cases, the court's power to act independently from counsel does not 
14
 A party claiming plain error must establish that: "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or 
phrased differently, [the appellate court's] confidence in the verdict is undermined." 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
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negate a party's concurrent obligation to preserve issues that the party wishes to raise on 
appeal. See cases discussed, supra, at 16-18. 
Furthermore, a court cannot be faulted for allowing a case to go to the jury, or 
allowing a subsequent jury verdict to stand, when the prosecution has established at least 
"some evidence" to support each element of the crime from which a reasonable jury could 
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For under these circumstances, it is the exclusive 
province of the jury to determine the weight to be accorded that evidence. Chaney, 1999 
Utah Ct. App. 309, % 30, 381 Utah Adv. Rep. 15. 
Here, defendant does not claim that there is no evidence to support each element of 
the crime (R.157: 200-01). Instead, he asserts that the jury should not have accorded the 
identification evidence full weight (Br. App. at 22-26). But weight is uniquely a jury • 
function. Chaney, id. Thus, even under defendant's reading of the facts, a dismissal, 
arrest of judgment, or new trial here would constitute an impermissible invasion of the 
province of the jury.15 
15
 Even in the cases cited by defendant which considered an unpreserved 
sufficiency claim for the first time on appeal, no court reversed where there was some 
evidence presented to support each element. See e.g. State v. Adams, 623 A.2d 42,46-47 
(Conn. 1993) (finding conflicted circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain verdict); 
Smith v. State, 213 A.2d 861 (Del. 1965) (circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain 
conviction, especially in light of unreasonableness of defendant's theory). Only where 
there was no evidence to support a requisite element was reversal warranted under either a 
plain error or "manifest injustice" concept. See e.g. Santistevan, 39 F.3d at 256-57 (plain 
error and exceptional circumstances justified sua sponte reversal where there was no 
evidence of material element); Pauoi, 891 P.2d at 278 (plain error justified reversal where 
there was no evidence of material element even though issue was not preserved); 
22 
The trial court also had no obligation to sua sponte question the admissibility of 
the eyewitness identification when defendant did not move for a Ramirez hearing and did 
not object to the admission of the various identifications during trial. Cf. Lopez, 886 P.2d 
at 1113 (finding no plain error or exceptional circumstances to justify review of 
unpreserved challenge to eyewitness identification); Olsen, 860 P.2d at 335 (applying 
"raise or waive" rule to eyewitness identification evidence). Compare State v. Nelson, 
950 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah App. 1997) (trial judge commits error if he or she fails to make 
Ramirez findings when requested). 
It was apparent that defense counsel was fully aware of the eyewitness issue but 
strategically chose to forego any objections to Mr. Davis's show-up identification so that 
he could use the discrepancies noted by Mr. Davis to bolster the defense. Counsel, an 
experienced legal defender, requested a line-up prior to the preliminary hearing (R. 23-
24). This record contains no details of that line-up, other than its result: Mr. Davis 
positively identified defendant (R.156: 93-94). Additionally, prior to trial, counsel 
submitted a complete "Long"16 cautionary jury instruction, as did the State, which 
instructions were ultimately given by the court (R. 48-50, 73-75, 99-101). Both these 
Jannamon, 819 P.2d at 1025-26 (fundamental error to allow child sex abuse conviction 
to stand where no proof of victim's age even though defendant did not contest the issue 
below). 
16
 State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,492 (Utah 1986) (requiring a cautionary 
eyewitness jury instruction when requested by the defense). 
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actions evidence trial counsel's understanding of the legal aspects underlying eyewitness 
identification. 
Counsel's cross-examination also demonstrated his understanding of the factual 
aspects of eyewitness testimony. The defense focused on the discrepancies noted by Mr. 
Davis during the show-up identification at the Hilton (R.156: 98-100). Contrary to 
defendant's current claim that the show-up was a product of "undue suggestion" (Br. 
App. at 24-25), the defense argued below that Mr. Davis's show-up identification was the 
"freshest" identification and, therefore, "the most likely to be accurate" (R.157: 190). By 
arguing that the show-up identification was the most reliable, the defense was able to use 
the differences in defendant's appearance noted by Mr. Davis to cast doubt on the overall 
evidence. The fact that the jury rejected this argument does not undercut its theoretical 
validity. State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 716-18 (Utah App. 1997) (defense counsel may 
strategically choose to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence, citing State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). 
Therefore, for the trial court to have sua sponte excluded the show-up evidence 
would have fundamentally interfered with defendant's trial strategy, a strategy that 
defendant is bound by on appeal absent a claim of ineffective counsel. See e.g. Irwin, 
924 P.2d at 11 (cautioning against use of exceptions as a way to address the effectiveness 
of counsel even though no ineffectiveness is alleged or established); Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1220 ("a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led 
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the trial court into committing the error'9); Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205-06 ("where invited 
error butts up against manifest injustice, the invited error rule prevails").17 
In sum, the trial court had no basis to believe it was committing error in allowing 
defense counsel to follow-through with what appeared to be a legitimate choice of 
strategy. Neither counsel's failure to object nor the evidence itself provided a basis from 
which the court should have sua sponte questioned the admissibility of the evidence. 
C. Defendant Has Failed to Establish Exceptional Circumstances. 
If defendant were correct that no evidence pointed to him as the Deseret Inn 
robber, then his conviction would indeed have to be reversed to avoid manifest injustice.1 
However, even defendant does not contend that there is no evidence to support his 
identification, only that the show-up identification was so inherently suggestive that any 
subsequent identifications must also be necessarily viewed as unreliable (Br. App. at 25). 
On this basis defendant claims exceptional circumstances. 
Because defendant did not raise the reliability issue below, the record does not 
17
 In making this argument, the State does not mean to suggest that any error 
occurred; only that to the extent defendant claims any error on appeal, his actions and 
defense lead the trial court into committing it. 
18
 "With the possible exception of an aberration or two, 'exceptional 
circumstances' is a concept that is used sparingly, properly reserved for truly exceptional 
situations, for cases - as our Supreme Court has recently recognized - involving 'rare 
procedural anomalies.'" Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209 n.3). See 
also discussion footnote 10, supra, at 14. 
25 
< 
contain full details surrounding the various identifications of defendant by Mr. Davis.19 
The record does establish that the show-up occurred within one hour of the robbery, 
presumptively to ensure that a basis for arrest existed despite defendant's denials and 
conflicting statements (R.156: 90,99,133-35). While defendant was in a business office 
with at least some police officers, it is unclear how many officers were there or if they 
were uniformed (R.156: 119,125,135,149-50, 152-53,166,169-70). Defendant 
apparently was not handcuffed. Compare Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784 (during show-up, 
suspect was handcuffed to fence, illuminated by headlights, and surrounded by uniformed 
officers); State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225,229 (Utah App. 1998) (same). 
Despite defendant's current claims of suggestiveness, it appears that Mr. Davis 
was especially observant and unwilling to positively identify defendant given the 
accessory (sweater and glasses) and hairstyle discrepancies. While any single-person 
show-up is more inherently suggestive than a multiple-person line-up, State v. Bruce, 779 
P.2d 646, 651 (Utah 1989), nothing in this record indicates that this show-up was unduly 
suggestive. 
Nor does Mr. Davis's "less than 100 percent certain" identification nullify his 
subsequent positive identifications. It is, instead, simply a factor to be considered by the 
jury in determining what weight to accord the ultimate identification. State v. Baker, 963 
19
 This lack of a fully developed record is one of the dangers the preservation rule 
seeks to avoid. See discussion of rationales behind rule, supra, at 19. 
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P.2d 801, 809 (Utah App.), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998); Rivera, 954 P.2d at 
228; Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1112; State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Utah 1983). This is 
especially true where Mr. Davis's description of the robber has remained consistent and 
he has never identified anyone other than defendant as the robber. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
783. 
In sum, defendant has failed to establish any reason for this Court to believe that 
his conviction is legally insufficient or otherwise lacks reliable support. 
* * * 
Because defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the legal sufficiency of the 
evidence and has established no exception to the preservation requirement, this Court 
should not consider the merits of his claim for the first time on appeal. 
POINT II 
ALTERNATIVELY, TO THE EXTENT DEFENDANT'S GENERAL 
DEFENSE PRESERVED A CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY 
OF THE EVIDENCE, THE EVIDENCE PROVIDES A 
REASONABLE BASIS TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
In addition to defendant's first argument that (1) no preservation is required for a 
sufficiency claim in a criminal case, and (2) plain error and exceptional circumstances 
justify review in this case (see Point I of both parties's briefs), defendant also claims that 
by merely defending against the criminal charge he has preserved his current sufficiency 
challenge (Br. App. at 17 & 22-26). This is incorrect. To the extent defendant's general 
defense may have preserved any challenge, it is merely a limited challenge to the 
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reasonableness of the jury's verdict. 
Defendant's defense was predicted on Mr. Davis's show-up identification. But 
unlike his current claim of suggestiveness, at trial defendant argued that the jury should 
accept the reliability of Mr. Davis's identification: 
So what we want to look at is identification was made within an hour 
after the robbery. That's when it's freshest in [Mr. Davis's] mind, when 
he's most likely to make an accurate identification. And at that point he 
said he was only 50 percent sure. Why is he 50 percent sure? Because my 
client is pretty average. He's pretty average. Average height, average hair 
color, average build. The robber, I think Ms. Dent put it best, would be like 
the boy next door. That's the problem with this case, we have an average 
person who goes in there and robs a store. 
(R. 157: 190). According to the defense, the discrepancies Mr. Davis observed at the 
Hilton were not simply changes in defendant's appearances but actual "differences" 
between defendant and the robber (R.157: 191-96). In addition, the circumstantial 
evidence was merely a series of coincidences: 
. . . I'll tell you what happened in this case. We have an average looking 
individual, young man, short brown hair, average build, average height, 
goes in the Deseret Inn. He holds the place up. He takes the cash, he runs 
down probably to the Hilton Hotel, even though we don't know that for 
sure, because no one saw him go in there. He goes in the Hilton Hotel, goes 
down, sits in the restaurant. He's sitting there. While he's sitting there he 
sees some commotion because another individual is being arrested. He 
goes, un-oh. First of all, he thinks he's gotten away with it, he thinks he's 
okay. So he goes to the hotel; he sits down. Now he sees some commotion 
going on. 
Now remember what happens is that there was police responding 
really quickly. If they get a call they are at the Hilton Hotel within five 
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minutes.20 So they come in, they arrest this individual. He is sitting there. 
He sees this happening, although now the police are nearer in the hotel. I'm 
in trouble, so he ditches the sweater. He goes across to the restroom, he 
ditches the gun there, then he splits out while they have my client in 
custody. 
My client is down there to meet his girlfriend and his friend, he's 
planning to have a good night out. There is a restaurant there, there is The 
Bay, is nearby, there's other bars around. And he brings his money. And 
as I've done on occasion, when I'm worried about being robbed, he put his 
money in his shoe You are going to go out at night, you are going to 
bring a lot of money with you. He is an average build, he is out in the 
lobby, he is on the phone, the police come up and grab him. That's what 
happened in this case. 
(R.157: 200-01). The defense also used the police report's reference to Mr. Davis being 
"50 percent sure" during the show-up to argue that it was "not enough for the state to 
even [the scales], to make it 50 percent that he's guilty . . . you have to tip the scale all the 
way to beyond a reasonable doubt" before the jury could convict (R. 157: 199). (A copy 
of defendant's entire closing argument is attached in Addendum B.) 
This general defense does not preserve the more specific identification challenge 
which defendant raises on appeal. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113-14 (failure to raise a 
constitutional challenge to a line-up and photo array waives the issue on appeal); OIsen9 
860 P.2d at 334 (failure to challenge eyewitness identifications on constitutional grounds 
waived the issue for purposes of appeal); Larocco, 665 P.2d at 1272-73 (refusing to 
20
 The police did not testify that they arrived at the Hilton five minutes after the 
robbery. One officer was dispatched at 6:25 p.m. to the Deseret Inn and arrived there 
about five minutes later; he then questioned Mr. Davis for about fifteen to twenty minutes 
before the two went to the Hilton (R.156: 133-34). 
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consider for the first time on appeal a claim of insufficient evidence predicated on a claim 
of a tainted line-up and photo spread); Wilson, 608 P.2d at 1239 (recognizing that failure 
to challenge an in-court identification waives the issue for purposes of appeal, but then 
finding no suggestiveness in identification); State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908, 909-10 
(Utah 1978) (defendant cannot raise for the first time on appeal factual discrepancies in 
the evidence that he did not raise at trial). 
Moreover, defendant's jury argument effectively conceded that the jury could 
convict defendant; the argument just pointed why, in defendant's opinion, a reasonable ' 
jury would not. In essence, defendant made this same concession by failing to move for 
dismissal or a directed verdict. See McDonough, 248 F.2d at 727 (where no motion for 
acquittal is made at the end of the government's case, appellate court assumes evidence 
was sufficient to support verdict). Cf. State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 523 (Utah 1983) 
("[i]f the State's evidence at the close of its case in chief does not establish a prima facie 
case against defendant, the Court must, as required by [Utah R. Crim. P.] Rule 17(o), 
dismiss the charge"). Having implicitly conceded the legal sufficiency of the evidence, 
the only argument colorably preserved by defendant's general defense is one of fact: 
would a reasonable juror have convicted him? That is, given the jury's prerogative to 
access the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence, does the 
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evidence provide a reasonable basis for the jury's verdict?21 
The following evidence establishes a basis for the jury verdict of guilt.22 
Defendant did not contest that: 
1. On January 20, 1998, the Deseret Inn was robbed of $800 to $850.00. 
2. The robber used a gun similar in appearance to a Crossman BB gun. 
3. The robber was a young male who wore baggy blue pants, a gray oversized 
sweater, a white shirt underneath, and two metal hoop earrings, one in each ear. 
21
 In general terms, this is the same assessment made when a sufficiency challenge 
is preserved. That is, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, is 
the evidence: 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted. 
Baker, 963 P.2d at 809. Accord State v. Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309, % 30, 381 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (citing State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)); State v. 
Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993); and State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 
1991)). 
But a defendant should not be allowed to avoid normal preservation requirements 
by cloaking an unpreserved legal claim, here the identification's inherent unreliability, 
within the general mantle of sufficiency. Accord Larocco, 665 P.2d at 1272 (where 
defendant failed to object to line-ups or photo arrays below, he could not raise this issue 
as a sufficiency claim for the first time on appeal); Wilson, 608 P.2d at 1239 (rejecting 
sufficiency argument predicated on unpreserved challenges to identification). Cf. Lopez, 
886 P.2d at 1113-14 (failure to challenge eyewitness identifications below cannot be 
raised for the first time on appeal). For this reason, the reliability of the identification 
evidence must be presumed. Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309, f 30. 
22
 Specific references to the record are contained in the State's Statement of Facts, 
supra, at 4-10. A comparison of the State's Statement of Facts and defendant's also 
demonstrates that defendant has failed to properly marshal all the evidence and inferences 
in favor of the jury verdict. This failure provides another ground for refusing to consider 
the merits of his appeal. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57,141,370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11; 
Vessey, 967 P.2d at 966. 
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4. When the robber left he appeared headed to the Hilton Hotel, about a block 
away. 
5. The robber hid the gun used in the robbery in a trash can in a bathroom directly 
across from Annabella's Restaurant, inside the Hilton Hotel. 
6. The robber entered Annabella's Restaurant wearing a gray sweater. 
7. The robber left his gray sweater behind when he left Annabella's. 
8. Defendant was detained at the Hilton Hotel shortly after the robbery and while, 
according to Ms. Dent and defense counsel, the robber was in the hotel. 
9. When he was stopped by the police, defendant was at the closest public 
telephone to Annabelle's and the bathroom where the gun was found. 
10. Defendant's height, weight, sex, age, skin color, hair color, and hair length 
were consistent with those of the robber's. 
11. Defendant's baggy blue pants were consistent with those of the robber and 
those of the man observed walking away from the Deseret Inn and towards the 
Hilton. 
12. Defendant had $850.00 in cash hidden in his shoes, the same amount taken in 
the robbery. 
Additionally, the following evidence, though contested, established that: 
13. Ms. Dent identified defendant as the person who wore the gray sweater into 
the restaurant and left it there. While defendant contested that he was the one who 
had left the sweater, he did not contest that the sweater was the robber's. 
14. Without a sweater or coat, defendant was dressed unreasonably for the cold 
winter weather. 
15. Defendant wore a metal hoop earring in each of his ears which earrings were, 
according to Mr. Davis, similar to the ones worn by the robber. 
16. Defendant's hair color and length were the same as the robber. While the 
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hairstyle differed, defendant's hair was wet when stopped by the police from 
which it could be reasonably inferred that defendant washed or rinsed his hair in 
the hotel's bathroom at the same time that he hid the gun in the trash. 
17. Defendant gave conflicting accounts of who he was going to meet. He told 
one officer he was meeting a male friend. He told another officer that he was 
meeting a female friend. And he told Ms. Dent in the restaurant that he was alone. 
And finally, having viewed the robber in good light, at close range, and with an 
unobstructed view, Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782; Rivera, 954 P.2d at 227, 
18. Mr. Davis made a "less than 100 per cent" identification of defendant an hour 
after the robbery based on changes in defendant's appearance, which changes 
could reasonably be accounted for: defendant rinsed or washed his hair, got rid of 
his sweater, and put on glasses before being stopped by the police. 
19. Mr. Davis positively identified defendant as the robber during a line-up. 
20. Mr. Davis had "no doubt" at trial that defendant was the robber. 
Given the totality of this evidence, the jury acted reasonably in convicting 
defendant. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ffl[ 42-27, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 11; Lopez, 886 P.2d at 
1112 (tentative initial identification did not negate subsequent positive in-court 
identification; evidence sufficient to convict); Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1362 (discrepancies 
between physical characteristics of described assailant and defendant went to credibility 
and were "best left" to the jury); Baker, 963 P.2d at 809 (inconsistent, confused 
testimony coupled with failure to identify defendant in a line-up did not render evidence 
insufficient for conviction). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on defendant's failure to challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence 
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below, this Court should refuse to consider the claim for the first time on appeal. 
Alternatively, to the extent defendant's closing argument may preserve a general 
challenge to the reasonableness of the verdict, the evidence provided a reasonable basis 
for defendant's conviction. This Court should affirm defendant's conviction for 
aggravated robbery. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ ^ j d a y of January, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney GelieTaTX 
^CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
76-6-302 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 17 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may con-
sent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause 
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury 
in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified 
in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
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(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally 
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any 
number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in 
the following order 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the 
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has 
rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the 
count, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the 
court shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides 
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall 
follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. 
The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each 
party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an 
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate 
juror If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed 
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new trial ordered. 
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while 
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with 
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the 
instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been received 
as evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take with him any 
notes of the testimony or other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken 
by any other person. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together 
in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by 
order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them 
if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is 
rendered, communicate to any person the state of their .deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge 
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
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defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and 
the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 23 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment. 
At anv time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own 
i n L ' e m S o?rPonmotionofadefendantshalla^ 
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment Upon 
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of heoffense 
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a oomnatment until the 
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be 
just and proper under the circumstances. 
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Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
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itsshould be used, but the court should take 
adv&r^age of special verdicts when specific is-
sues cahnot otherwise be reached. Baker v. 
Cook. 6 UtahvW 161, 308 P.2d 264 (1957). 
There is no impropriety in submitting special 
interrogatories if th^court so desires. Hanks v. 
Christensen. 11 Utah^tfsk 354 P.2d 564 (1960). 
Trial court did not err Ihsgubmitting special 
interrogatories instead of a general verdict as 
requested by plaintiff. This rule sahefcions sug 
procedure. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 15 
Utah 2d 257, 391 P2d280 (1964). 
Where jury answers to special interrogato-
ries submitted on all disputed material issues 
are adversetarlhe defendant, the court properly 
entered Urffgment for the plaintiff. S & F Sup-
ply Gafv. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217 (Utah 1974). 
Cited in Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 
(Utah 1982). 
COL , REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — RecepfDevelopments 
in Utah Law. 1980 Utah LJRev. 649. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75B AnKVur. 2d Trial 1835 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 88 C J ^ T r i a l §§ 526 to 573. 
A.L.R. — Submission of special interrogato-
ries in connection with general verdict under 
Federal Rule 49(b), and state counterparts, 6 
A.L.R.3d^38. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Competency of juror's statement or affidavit 
show that verdict in civil case was not 
correctly reported, 18 A.L.R.3d 1132. 
Validity of verdict or verdicts by same jury in 
personal iimiry action awarding damages to 
injured spou&eJbut denying recovery to other 
spouse seekingScollateral damages, or vice 
versa, 66 A.L.R.3cT4^2. 
' Products liability: inconsistency of verdicts 
on separate theories of negligence, breach of 
warranty, or strict liability, 4PA.L.R.4th 9. 
Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect A party who moves for a 
directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may offer 
evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having reserved 
the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. 
Amotion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by 
jury even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A 
motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The 
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without 
any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for 
a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any 
reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the 
jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment 
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, within 
ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may 
be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. 
If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may 
reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of 
judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed: If no verdict was 
returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for in 
Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on the motion 
for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if the 
judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for 
granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the motion for a new trial is 
thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the finality of the 
judgment. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted 
and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the 
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appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has 
been conditionally denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that 
denial; and if the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings 
shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. 
(d) Same: denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, 
assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate court 
concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether 
a new trial shall be granted. 
177 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
{ 1004 et seq. judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
C J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments <§§ 574 to 584. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have 
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by 
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the applica-
tion, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period 
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
TRIAL Rule 29 
Rule 29. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
(a) Motion Before Submission to Jury. Motions 
for directed verdict are abolished and motions for 
judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place. 
The court on motion of a defendant or of its own 
motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal 
of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or 
information after the evidence on either side is closed 
if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of 
such offense or offenses. If a defendant's motion for 
judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence 
offered by the government is not granted, the defen-
dant may offer evidence without having reserved the 
right 
(b) Reservation of Decision on Motion. The 
court may reserve decision on a motion for judgment 
of acquittal, proceed with the trial (where the motion 
is made before the close of all the evidence), submit 
the case to the jury and decide the motion either 
before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a 
verdict of guilty or is discharged without having re-
turned a verdict If the court reserves decision, it 
must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at 
the time the ruling was reserved. 
(c) Motion After Discharge of Jury. If the jury 
returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without 
having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of 
acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after 
the jury is discharged or within such further time as 
the court may fix during the 7-day period. If a 
verdict of guilty is returned the court may on such 
motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of 
acquittal. If no verdict is returned the court may 
enter judgment of acquittal. It shall not be necessary 
to the making of such a motion that a similar motion 
has been made prior to the submission of the case to 
the jury. 
(d) Same: Conditional Ruling on Grant of Mo-
tion. If a motion for judgment of acquittal after 
verdict of guilty under this Rule is granted, the court 
shall also determine whether any motion for a new 
trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is 
thereafter vacated or reversed, specifying the grounds 
for such determination. If the motion for a new trial 
is granted conditionally, the order thereon does not 
affect the finality of the judgment If the motion for a 
new trial has been granted conditionally and the judg-
ment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed 
unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. If 
such motion has been denied conditionally, the appel-
lee on appeal may assert error in that denial, and if 
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent pro-
ceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the 
appellate court 
(As amended Feb. 28,1966, eff. July 1,1966; Nov. 10,1986, 
Pub.L. 99-646, § 54(a), 100 Stat 3607; Apr. 29, 1994, eff. 
Dec. 1,1994.) 
Addendum B 
1 WITH $850.00 IN HIS SHOES. 
2 LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THERE SIMPLY IS NO 
3 OTHER EXPLANATION. WE CAN, IN LIFE, ACCEPT A LOT 
4 OF FOIBLES OF HUMAN BEINGS, WE DON'T ALWAYS 
5 REMEMBER. FOR SURE THERE'S THINGS THAT HAPPENED 
6 WHEN WE GET FRIGHTENED, THERE'S UNSURITIES, THERE 
7 IS THINGS THAT POLICE DO. THERE IS A LOT OF TIME 
8 WE BREAK DOWN AS HUMAN BEINGS. WE ARE NOT EXPECTED 
9 TO STRETCH OUR IMAGINATIONS TO FIND A WAY THAT IS 
10 EVEN CLOSE TO REASONABLE TO FIND THE DEFENDANT NOT 
11 GUILTY. WE EXPECT AND RELY ON YOU AS REASONABLE 
12 PEOPLE TO LOOK AND JUDGE THE FACTS. 
13 IF ONE LOOKS AT THESE REASONABLY THERE IS 
14 SIMPLY NO OTHER EXPLANATION THAT ALL OF THESE 
15 EVENTS COULD HAVE COME TOGETHER, THERE IS SIMPLY NO 
16 WAY FOR SOMEONE THAT LOOKS LIKE THE DEFENDANT, TO 
17 BE IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE, DOING THOSE THINGS, WITH 
18 EVERYTHING ELSE, WITH THAT MONEY IN HIS POCKET. 
19 THAT IS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND THAT IS WHY 
20 HE IS GUILTY. I ASK YOU TO FIND HIM SO. THANK 
21 YOU. 
22 MR. O'CONNELLt YOUR HONOR, I'D LIKE TO 
23 BRING THE BOARD OVER. IF IT PLEASE THE COURT, 
24 COUNSEL, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY. I'D 
25 LIKE TO USE THE BOARD HERE, AND THE JUDGE KNOWS 
1 THAT. THAT IS MY SYMBOL PROM MY LAST ONE. ONE 
2 THING I WANTED TO START OUT RIGHT AWAY, AND I 
3 THINK THERE'S AN INSTRUCTION ON IT, WHAT WE SAY 
4 IN ARGUMENT IS NOT EVIDENCE. OKAY? I WANT YOU 
5 TO MAKE SURE THAT WHAT WE SAY IS NOT WHAT THE 
6 FACTS ARE. IT'S WHAT YOU REMEMBER THE FACTS ARE. 
7 THE REASON I SAY THAT IS I'VE HEARD 
8 MR. PARKER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT. AND I DISAGREE 
9 TOTALLY ON SOME OF THE FACTS AS HE HAS LISTED. 
10 IN FACT, AS I RECALL THE EVIDENCE, THEY WERE 
11 COMPLETELY DIFFERENT. AND THAT IS UP TO YOU TO 
12 GO BACK TO YOUR RECOLLECTION AND REMEMBER THAT. 
13 I WILL GO THROUGH AND PICK OUT THE ONES WHERE I 
14 THINK HE HAS A DIFFERENCE. 
15 NOW, THIS IS AN I.D. CASE. I DISAGREE 
16 WITH THE STATE. IT IS TOTALLY AN I.D. CASE. NOW 
17 THE OTHER EVIDENCE MAY COME AROUND TO SUPPORT 
18 THAT I.D. OR TAKE AWAY FROM THAT I.D., BUT 
19 TOTALLY I.D. CASES, OR ONE PERSON AT ALL WAS ABLE 
20 TO TESTIFY OR, IN THIS CASE, ANY IDENTIFICATION 
21 AT ALL, AND THAT WAS GREG DAVIS. AND THAT WAS 
22 ONLY 5 0 PERCENT LIKELY. 
2 3 NOW WHAT'S IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE IS TO 
24 REMEMBER THAT THIS ROBBERY TOOK PLACE REALLY 
25 QUICKLY. IT WAS TWO TO THREE MINUTES. MOST OF 
1 THE TIME MR. DAVIS IS LOOKING AT, FIRST HE'S 
2 LOOKING AT THE GUY'S POCKETS. YOU REMEMBER HE 
3 SAYS, HE WAS WATCHING THE GUY'S POCKETS AS HE 
4 WALKED IN BECAUSE HE THOUGHT SOMETHING WAS 
5 STRANGE. HE WAS KEEPING AN EYE ON HIS POCKETS. 
6 WHEN HE CAME UP HE PULLED OUT THE GUN, WHICH HE 
7 WAS HOLDING DOWN LOW. AND ANY REASONABLE PERSON 
8 IS GOING TO DO, YOU ARE GOING TO KEEP AN EYE ON 
9 AND SEE WHERE THAT GUN WAS POINTED, IF IT WAS 
10 POINTED ON YOU. HE SAID HE TRIED TO KEEP MOVING. 
11 HE HAD TO GO OPEN THE REGISTER, WHICH REQUIRES 
12 ATTENTION, OPEN IT UP, AND THEN HE WENT BACK TO 
13 THE BACK ROOM. 
14 SO THE MOMENT HE HAD TO LOOK AT THE 
15 DEFENDANT WAS QUITE SHORT, WHICH WAS PROBABLY 
16 EVEN LESS THAN TWO MINUTES, BECAUSE MOST OF HIS 
17 TIME HIS ATTENTION IS NOT GOING TO BE AT THE 
18 ROBBER'S FACE. 
19 THE REASON THAT'S IMPORTANT IS THAT 
20 WHAT'S MORE LIKELY TO BE CORRECT? WHEN YOU ONLY 
21 HAVE A FEW MINUTES TO LOOK AT SOMEBODY, WHEN IS 
22 YOUR IDENTIFICATION GOING TO BE MOST ACCURATE? 
23 AND THAT IS WHEN? THE SOONEST AFTER THE ROBBERY, 
24 BECAUSE WHEN TIMES GOES BY YOUR MEMORY IS GOING 
2 5 TO CHANGE, YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE THE PROBLEM OF 
1 HAVING SEEN THE DEFENDANT FOR LONGER PERIODS OF 
2 TIME OR SEEN MR. RUDOLPH FOR LONGER PERIODS OF 
3 TIME, AND THIS IS GOING TO CLOUD YOUR JUDGMENT. 
4 SO WHAT WE WANT TO LOOK AT IS 
5 IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE WITHIN AN HOUR AFTER THE 
6 ROBBERY. THAT'S WHEN IT'S FRESHEST IN HIS MIND, 
7 WHEN HE'S MOST LIKELY TO MAKE AN ACCURATE 
8 IDENTIFICATION. AND AT THAT POINT HE SAID HE WAS 
9 ONLY 50 PERCENT SURE. WHY IS HE 50 PERCENT SURE? 
10 BECAUSE MY CLIENT IS PRETTY AVERAGE. HE'S PRETTY 
11 AVERAGE. AVERAGE HEIGHT, AVERAGE HAIR COLOR, 
12 AVERAGE BUILD. THE ROBBER, I THINK MS. DENT PUT 
13 IT BEST, WOULD BE LIKE THE BOY NEXT DOOR. THAT'S 
14 THE PROBLEM WITH THIS CASE, WE HAVE AN AVERAGE 
15 PERSON WHO GOES IN THERE AND ROBS A STORE. 
16 NOW MR. PARKER SAYS, I RULED OUT A 
17 WHOLE BUNCH OF PEOPLE. THAT IS A HUGE GROUP OF 
18 PEOPLE. THAT TAKES A HUGE GROUP OF PEOPLE, YOUNG 
19 MEN WITH SHORT BROWN HAIR. JUST IN THIS 
2 0 COURTROOM ALONE, I HAVE SHORT BROWN HAIR, 
21 MR. PARKER HAS SHORT BROWN HAIR, MR. RUDOLPH HAS 
22 SHORT BROWN HAIR. IT'S COMMON. IT'S COMMON 
23 CASE. SO WE TAKE SOMEBODY WHO IS THE AVERAGE BOY 
24 NEXT DOOR, HE GOES IN THERE AND GRABS SOMEBODY 
25 ELSE WHO IS AVERAGE. THAT'S WHY HE'S 50 PERCENT 
1 SURE BECAUSE THEY'RE BOTH AVERAGE. 
2 NOW THE STATE SAYS THE REASON WHY HE'S 
3 ONLY 50 PERCENT SURE IS BECAUSE HE CHANGED HIS 
4 APPEARANCE. I WANT TO TELL YOU IT IS NOT 
5 CHANGES, THESE ARE DIFFERENCES. THE STATE'S JUST 
6 TRYING TO EXPLAIN AWAY THE CHANGE IN HIS 
7
 t APPEARANCE. THESE ARE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 
8 ACTUAL ROBBER AND MY CLIENT. 
9 ONE. I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANT IS HIS 
10 GLASSES. THE ROBBER DID NOT HAVE GLASSES ON. 
11 CAME INTO THE STORE, NO GLASSES. MY CLIENT HAD 
12 GLASSES ON WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED. HE WAS WITH A 
13 POLICE OFFICER WHO TESTIFIED HE HAD GLASSES ON, 
14 WHEN THEY PUT HIM IN THE ROOM HE HAD GLASSES ON. 
15 NOW, THAT'S CRUCIAL. NOW THE STATE'S SAYING 
16 BECAUSE -- WHEN HE ROBBED THE PLACE HE WASN'T 
17 WEARING HIS GLASS. WHY? WHY WOULD THE ROBBER 
18 HAVE TAKEN OFF HIS GLASSES FOR THE ROBBERY? 
19 TWO. WHERE DID HE PUT THEM? HE ONLY 
20 HAD LEVI'S AND A SWEATER ON. SUPPOSEDLY, IF 
21 ANYBODY WEARS GLASSES THEY ARE NOT GOING TO PUT 
22 THEM IN A POCKET BECAUSE THEY'RE GOING TO GET 
23 CRUSHED, UNLESS THE ROBBER THOUGHT HE WAS GOING 
24 TO DO A SUPERMAN DEFENSE. CLARK KENT TAKES OFF 
25 HIS. HE'S SUPERMAN. OBVIOUSLY, THIS ROBBER 
1 DIDN'T WEAR A MASK DISGUISE AND TAKE OFF HIS 
2 GLASSES IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONFUSE PEOPLE. HE HAS 
3 GLASSES ON. THAT'S HUGE. THAT IS A BIG 
4 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MY CLIENT AND THEIR CLIENT. 
5 TWO. THE COLOGNE. THE ROBBER HAD 
6 COLOGNE. AND AGAIN I WANT YOU TO LOOK BACK. I 
7 MEAN, HE TESTIFIES, HE IS KIND OF WAFFLING, KINDA 
8 MAKES IT SOUND LIKE IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN COLOGNE, 
9 JUST STRONG MOUSSE, BUT WHEN AGAIN, BACK WHEN HE 
10 WAS AT THE SCENE, HE TOLD THE OFFICER THAT THE 
11 ROBBER SMELLED OF COLOGNE. AND THAT MY CLIENT, 
12 WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED, AND I DON'T KNOW IF THE 
13 OFFICERS TESTIFIED THAT THE WITNESS SAID HE HAD 
14 COLOGNE, OR HE SMELLED MY CLIENT, BUT IN HIS 
15 STATEMENT THAT GUY DID NOT SMELL OF COLOGNE. 
16 TURTLENECK. MR. MC CANN SAID BACK THEN 
17 HE THOUGHT THE INDIVIDUAL HAD A TURTLENECK ON. 
18 NOW HE SAYS HE IS NOT SO SURE. THAT'S BECAUSE 
19 TIME HAS GONE PAST, NOW HE SEES THEY HAVE A 
20 T-SHIRT AND NOT A TURTLENECK. OF COURSE HE'S 
21 GOING TO START SAYING, WELL, MAYBE I AM NOT SO 
22 SURE. HE'S GOING TO CHANGE HIS TESTIMONY TO FIT 
23 WHAT THE EVIDENCE IS, BUT BACK THEN HE SAID THE 
24 ROBBER HAD A TURTLENECK. 
25 THE EARRINGS. NOW I ASKED THE GANG 
1 TASK OFFICER, AND I'M GLAD HE WAS HERE, BECAUSE 
2 HE TESTIFIED THAT IT'S NOT UNCOMMON FOR THE YOUTH 
3 OF UTAH, ESPECIALLY THE ONES HE DEALS WITH 
4 DOWNTOWN, TO BE WEARING BAGGY LEVI'S. THAT'S 
5 COMMON. IT IS NOT UNCOMMON FOR THEM TO BE 
6 WEARING EARRINGS. JUST THE FACT THAT HE HAD 
7 EARRINGS ON DOESN'T REALLY MEAN MUCH, BUT THIS IS 
8 WHERE I DISAGREE WITH WHAT THE WITNESS SAID. 
9 HE SAID -- HE DIDN'T SAY HE DOESN'T 
10 REMEMBER WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD ANY ORNAMENTATION, 
11 HE SAID ON THE STAND HE REMEMBERS THEM BEING 
12 PLAIN. PLAIN EARRINGS. IF YOU LOOK AT THOSE 
13 EARRINGS THEY AREN'T PLAIN. THEY LOOK LIKE 
14 WEDDING BANDS. SO WE HAVE PLAIN, FAIRLY THICK 
15 LOOKING EARRINGS ON THE ROBBER. HE ALSO SAID, 
16 TOLD THE POLICE THAT THEY WERE GOLD, AND AT 
17 ANOTHER HEARING PRIOR TO THIS WHEN HE TESTIFIED 
18 ON THE STAND UNDER OATH, AGAIN HE SAID THAT THE 
19 EARRINGS WERE GOLD. TODAY HE SAYS THEY MAY HAVE 
2 0 BEEN GOLD OR SILVER. 
21 NOW THAT KINDA DEMONSTRATES A PROBLEM 
22 WITH THE STATE'S CASE AND THEIR PROBLEM WITH 
23 MEMORY IN GENERAL. BACK THEN, RIGHT AFTER THE 
24 INCIDENT, HE IS SURE THEY'RE GOLD, BUT 
25 AFTERWARDS, AFTER BEING MORE INVOLVED IN THE 
1 CASE, FINDING OUT THAT THE EARRINGS ON THE 
2 DEFENDANT AREN•T GOLD, HE STARTS CHANGING HIS 
3 TESTIMONY, CHANGING IT JUST ENOUGH THAT IT STARTS 
4 FITTING. NOW HE IS NOT SURE, THOUGH, IF THEY'RE 
5 GOLD OR SILVER. THAT IS BECAUSE HE WANTS TO BE 
6 HELPFUL. I DON'T THINK HE'S LYING, BUT I THINK 
7 HE WANTED TO MAKE THE CASE BETTER SO HE'S NOT 
8 SWITCHING TO GOLD OR SILVER. BACK THEN HE SAID 
9 THEY WERE GOLD. 
10 THE STATE ALSO TALKS ABOUT OTHER 
11 THINGS. HE WASN'T WEARING A SWEATER. NO GRAY 
12 SWEATER WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED. NOW THE STATE 
13 MAKES A DEAL OUT OF THE FACT WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED 
14 HE WASN'T WEARING A COAT OR SWEATER. AND IT WAS 
15 COLD OUT IN JANUARY. I SHOULD POINT OUT HE 
16 WASN'T ARRESTED OUTSIDE, HE WAS ARRESTED INSIDE. 
17 SO IT WASN'T SURPRISING HE WASN'T WEARING HIS' 
18 COAT AT THE TIME. WHEN THE GANG TASK FORCE ASKED 
19 HIM IF THIS WAS YOUR SWEATER, HE TOLD HIM NO, I 
20 HAD A COAT. SO HE DID HAVE A COAT. HE JUST 
21 DIDN'T HAVE 'EM ON HIM. AND I'M SURE THE STATE 
22 AGAIN IS GOING TO POINT OUT WHERE THE FACT ONE OF 
23 THE OTHER OFFICERS ASKED HIM, IT'S COLD OUTSIDE, 
24 AND MY CLIENT SAID HE DID HAVE A COAT. 
25 BUT I WANT TO MAKE ANOTHER POINT. ALL 
1 THE STATEMENT'S MY CLIENT MADE, THE POLICE 
2 RELAYED TO YOU, ARE JUST SHORT, ONE BIT 
3 STATEMENTS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT. THE OFFICER 
4 ASKED HIM, ARE YOU WEARING A COAT, NO, I'M NOT. 
5 HE WASN'T WEARING A COAT. ANOTHER OFFICER COMES 
6 UP AND GOES, IS THIS YOUR SWEATER? HE SAYS, 
7 YEAH, I HAD A COAT. THEY'RE NOT INCONSISTENT. 
8 THE ONE STATEMENT IS TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT. HE 
9 DID HAVE A COAT ON AT THE TIME. AND THAT'S 
10 PROBABLY WHAT HE WAS ANSWERING TO THE OFFICER. 
11 THE OTHER OFFICER EXPLAINS HE HAS A COAT. I BET 
12 IF THEY LOOKED AROUND, LOOKED AROUND THE HOTEL, 
13 LOOKED IN LOST AND FOUND WHERE IT PROBABLY IS 
14 NOW, THEY WOULD HAVE FOUND MY CLIENT'S COAT. 
15 CHANGES. THE STATE AGAIN MAKES A BIG 
16 DEAL WITH THE FACT MY CLIENT ALLEGEDLY CHANGED 
17 HIS APPEARANCE. THEY SAY HE LOOKED LIKE HE WAS 
18 WASHED. BECAUSE HIS HAIR WAS WET. NOW THIS 
19 ACTUALLY, IN SOME WAYS, IS A BAD FACT FOR US, BUT 
20 I THINK IT KINDA SHOWS YOU WHERE THE STATE'S 
21 WRONG HERE. IF YOU WILL RECALL, OFFICERS SAID 
22 HIS HAIR, MY CLIENT'S HAIR, LOOKED WET AND KINDA 
23 SPIKY. AND IF YOU GO BACK TO THE ROBBERY, WHAT 
24 DOES GREG DAVIS SAY HIS HAIR LOOKED LIKE? KINDA 
2 5 WET AND SPIKY. 
1 NOW I SAY THAT IS A BAD BREAK FOR US 
2 BECAUSE IT SEEMS LIKE A SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE 
3 TWO OF THEM, BUT I THINK THAT'S COMMON WHERE MOST 
4 YOUTH, INDIVIDUALS TODAY, PUT MOUSSE IN THEIR 
5 HAIR, WEAR IT SHORT, AND WEAR IT SPIKY. WELL, 
6 THE STATE GOES, HIS HAIR WAS WET SO HE WAS 
7 OBVIOUSLY CHANGING HIS APPEARANCE, TRYING TO MAKE 
8 HIMSELF LOOK DIFFERENT, BUT HE DIDN'T LOOK 
9 DIFFERENT. AT LEAST HIS HAIR DIDN'T LOOK 
10 DIFFERENT. BUT REMEMBER WHEN GREG DAVIS GOES IN 
11 AND SEES HIM? HE KNOWS HIS HAIR IS DIFFERENT, 
12 BUT HE CAN'T IDENTIFY HIM. HE HAS MY CLIENT, 
13 DIDN'T DO ANYTHING TO CHANGE HIS APPEARANCE, 
14 SIMILARITIES BETWEEN HIM AND THE ROBBER, BUT HE 
15 WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY HIM. 
16 NOW I WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE MONEY, 
17 BECAUSE THE STATE MAKES AN ISSUE ABOUT THE MONEY. 
18 IT IS, AGAIN, WHERE I DISAGREE WITH THEM. THEY 
19 SAY APPROXIMATELY 800.00 TO $850.00 WAS TAKEN. 
20 WE DON'T KNOW THAT. WE DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH MONEY 
21 WAS TAKEN. THE PERSON WHO ACTUALLY COUNTED AND 
22 DECIDED HOW MUCH MONEY NEVER CAME AND TESTIFIED 
23 TODAY AND TOLD US HOW MUCH MONEY WAS TAKEN. 
24 AGAIN WE ARE RELYING ON GREG DAVIS' MEMORY OVER A 
25 YEAR LATER, AFTER HE'S PROBABLY FOUND OUT WHAT 
1 THE FACTS WERE, HOW MUCH MONEY WAS TAKEN FROM THE 
2 ROBBERY. AND NOW HE APPROXIMATES THAT ABOUT 
3 $80 0.0 0 WAS TAKEN. HE DOESN'T KNOW HOW MUCH 
4 MONEY WAS TAKEN. HE JUST KNOWS THE FACTS OF THIS 
5 CASE AND HE'S APPROXIMATING HOW MUCH MONEY WAS 
6 TAKEN. FOR ALL WE KNOW THERE MAY HAVE BEEN 
7 $400.00 IN THERE, BECAUSE THERE'S ALWAYS $400.00 
8 IN THE TILL. THAT'S IT. SO IT ISN'T COINCIDENCE 
9 THEY HAD 8 5 0.00 WAS TAKEN. HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW 
10 MUCH WAS TAKEN, WE DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH WAS TAKEN, 
11 THE STATE HASN'T SHOWN US HOW MUCH MONEY WAS 
12 TAKEN. IT'S SOMETHING THAT WAS UNKNOWN. OKAY? 
13 I JUST WANT TO POINT OUT OTHER THINGS 
14 ABOUT MR. DAVIS. THE FACT THAT, YOU KNOW, HE 
15 COULD GET THE MONEY WRONG. HE GETS THE ADDRESS 
16 OF WHERE HE WORKS WRONG. OKAY? A YEAR AGO HE 
17 WORKS AT THIS PLACE AND HE THINKS IT IS 500 SOUTH 
18 200 WEST. IT WASN'T UNTIL MR. PARKER CORRECTS 
19 HIM, AND ISN'T IT REALLY 50 WEST, THAT HE CHANGED 
20 IT. HE GETS THE ADDRESS WRONG. HE IS NOT 
21 EXACTLY SURE WHAT THE TIME WAS. IT MIGHT HAVE 
22 BEEN 6:00 OR 7:00. HE ADMITS TO IT BEING A LONG 
23 TIME AGO AND HE CAN'T ALWAYS REMEMBER ALL THE 
24 DETAILS AND HE DIDN'T COUNT THE MONEY SO WE DON'T 
25 KNOW HOW MUCH MONEY WAS TAKEN. 
1 AGAIN, I WANT TO TALK A LITTLE BIT 
2 ABOUT THE STATEMENT BECAUSE MR. PARKER SAYS MY 
3 CLIENT MADE INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. AGAIN, WE 
4 HEARD JUST ONE SHORT PHRASE FROM SEVERAL 
5 DIFFERENT OFFICERS AND THEY WERE COMPLETELY TAKEN 
6 OUT OF CONTEXT. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THE CONTEXT 
7 WAS, WHAT OTHER STATEMENTS WERE MADE, WE DON'T 
8 KNOW WHAT THE WHOLE CONVERSATION WAS. THESE 
9 STATEMENTS BY THEMSELVES MAY LOOK INCONSISTENT. 
10 HE WAS THERE TO MEET HIS FRIEND, HE WAS THERE TO 
11 MEET HIS GIRLFRIEND, HE WAS THERE TO MEET BOTH OF 
12 THEM. HE JUST TOLD TWO DIFFERENT OFFICERS. ONE 
13 HE TOLD HE WAS MEETING HIS FRIEND. THAT IS WHAT 
14 HE BROUGHT UP. AND THE OTHER HE TOLD HE WAS 
15 GOING TO MEET HIS GIRLFRIEND. 
16 AGAIN, ABOUT THE COAT, HE TELLS ONE 
17 OFFICER AT ONE POINT HE WAS WEARING A COAT AND 
18 ANOTHER TIME HE WAS WEARING A COAT. AGAIN, THESE 
19 STATEMENTS ARE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT. IF WE KNEW 
20 THE WHOLE CONTENTS OF THE CONVERSATION, HOW IT 
21 ALL WENT, THEY WOULDN'T LOOK INCONSISTENT. 
22 I WANTED TO TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT 
23 REASONABLE DOUBT. NOW THE VERY EXPERIENCED DEFENSE 
24 ATTORNEY ONCE DEMONSTRATED REASONABLE DOUBT AND DID 
25 THE BEST JOB OF TRYING TO EXPLAIN, BECAUSE IT IS 
1 NOT EASY. WHAT'S BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT? WE 
2 KNOW IT IS THE HIGHEST STANDARD IN THE CRIMINAL, 
3 NOT EVEN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, IN THE 
4 JUSTICE SYSTEM ALL TOGETHER. IT IS A HIGHEST 
5 STANDARD. WHAT DOES REASONABLE DOUBT MEAN? NOW 
6 THERE ARE WAYS TO SHOW IT, EXPLAIN IT, AND I 
7 THOUGHT MAYBE YOU CAN BETTER VISUALIZE IT, IS 
8 LOOKING AT THE SCALES OF JUSTICE. WE HAVE THESE 
9 SCALES BALANCED EVENLY. YOU ALWAYS SEE 'EM ON THE 
10 COURTHOUSE, THE WOMAN HOLDING THE SALES OF JUSTICE. 
11 NOW THE SCALES DON'T START OUT EVENLY, OKAY, LIKE 
12 MOST SCALES DO. THAT IS BECAUSE THERE IS A 
13 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. MR. RUDOLPH IS PRESUMED 
14 TO BE INNOCENT SO THE SCALES ARE TIPPED ALL THE WAY 
15 IN HIS FAVOR. AND IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR THE STATE 
16 TO EVEN THEM, TO MAKE IT 50 PERCENT THAT HE'S 
17 GUILTY. IF THAT'S THE CASE, HE IS NOT GUILTY, IT 
18 IS NOT ENOUGH TO TIP THE SCALES TO HIS ADVANTAGE. 
19 THAT'S PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. THAT IS A 
2 0 CIVIL STANDARD. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO GO TO CLEAR 
21 AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, WHICH IS ANOTHER CIVIL 
22 STANDARD. YOU HAVE TO TIP THE SCALE ALL THE WAY TO 
23 BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. SO THE SCALE GOES FROM 
24 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ALL THE WAY TO BEYOND A 
2 5 REASONABLE DOUBT. ALL THE DEFENDANT HAS TO DO IS 
1 TIP THE SCALE TO, BACK TO BELOW BEYOND A REASONABLE 
2 DOUBT. NOT MUCH OF A STANDARD. 
3 NOW WHY IS THERE REASONABLE DOUBT IN THIS 
4 CASE? I THINK I'VE GONE THROUGH GENERALLY, BUT 
5 I'LL TELL YOU WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE. WE HAVE 
6 AN AVERAGE LOOKING INDIVIDUAL, YOUNG MAN, SHORT 
7 BROWN HAIR, AVERAGE BUILD, AVERAGE HEIGHT, GOES IN 
8 THE DESERET INN. HE HOLDS THE PLACE UP, HE TAKES 
9 THE CASH, HE RUNS DOWN PROBABLY TO THE HILTON 
10 HOTEL, EVEN THOUGH WE DON'T KNOW THAT FOR SURE, 
11 BECAUSE NO ONE SAW HIM GO IN THERE. HE GOES IN THE 
12 HILTON HOTEL, GOES DOWN, SITS IN THE RESTAURANT. 
13 HE'S SITTING THERE. WHILE HE'S SITTING THERE HE 
14 SEES SOME COMMOTION BECAUSE ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL IS 
15 BEING ARRESTED. HE GOES, UH-OH. FIRST OF ALL, HE 
16 THINKS HE'S GOTTEN AWAY WITH IT, HE THINKS HE'S 
17 OKAY. SO HE GOES TO THE HOTEL; HE SITS DOWN. NOW 
18 HE SEES SOME COMMOTION GOING ON. 
19 NOW REMEMBER WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT THERE 
20 WAS POLICE RESPONDING REALLY QUICKLY. IF THEY GET 
21 A CALL THEY ARE AT THE HILTON HOTEL WITHIN FIVE 
22 MINUTES. SO THEY COME IN, THEY ARREST THIS 
23 INDIVIDUAL. HE IS SITTING THERE. HE SEES THIS 
24 HAPPENING, ALTHOUGH NOW THE POLICE ARE NEARER IN 
25 THE HOTEL. I'M IN TROUBLE, SO HE DITCHES THE 
1 SWEATER. HE GOES ACROSS TO THE RESTROOM, HE 
2 DITCHES THE GUN THERE, THEN HE SPLITS OUT WHILE 
3 THEY HAVE MY CLIENT IN CUSTODY. 
4 MY CLIENT IS DOWN THERE TO MEET HIS 
5 GIRLFRIEND AND HIS FRIEND, HE'S PLANNING TO HAVE A 
6 GOOD NIGHT OUT. THERE IS A RESTAURANT THERE, THERE 
7 IS THE BAY, IS NEARBY, THERE'S OTHER BARS AROUND. 
8 AND HE BRINGS HIS MONEY. AND AS I'VE DONE ON 
9 OCCASION, WHEN I'M WORRIED ABOUT BEING ROBBED, HE 
10 PUT HIS MONEY IN HIS SHOE. WHEN I WAS BACK IN 
11 COLLEGE, BEFORE I HAD CREDIT CARDS, I USED TO CARRY 
12 QUITE A BIT OF CASK ON ME. THAT'S WHERE I WOULD 
13 CARRY IT BECAUSE I WOULD BE VERY PARANOID. I USED 
14 TO GO TO SCHOOL IN NEW YORK SO IT'S A DIFFERENT 
15 FACTOR, BUT I ALWAYS CARRIED IT IN MY SHOE AS WELL. 
16 THAT'S NOT TOO SURPRISING. AND WHEN YOU DON'T HAVE 
17 CREDIT CARDS YOU RELY ON CASH. YOU ARE GOING TO GO 
18 OUT AT NIGHT, YOU ARE GOING TO BRING A LOT OF MONEY 
19 WITH YOU. HE IS AN AVERAGE BUILD, HE IS OUT IN THE 
20 LOBBY, HE IS ON THE PHONE, THE POLICE COME UP AND 
21 GRAB HIM. THAT'S WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE. AND 
22 I WOULD ASK YOU TO FIND MY CLIENT NOT GUILTY. 
23 THE COURT: MR. PARKER? 
24 MR. PARKER: I GUESS WHAT I WANT TO DO 
25 IS ADDRESS A COUPLE OF THINGS. AND I DON'T WANT 
